



uring the late 1990s much was made
in Canada, especially in elite and media
circles, about the slow pace of produc-
tivity growth, especially relative to the United
States, and this concern and focus are still evi-
dent. In government terms the debate about
productivity has recently shifted to talk about
innovation. A somewhat cynical view might see
the shift from productivity to innovation as
largely a linguistic manoeuvre on the part of
government, since both are part of the govern-
ment’s plans for expanding the economy and
ensuring prosperity for Canadians. Ironically
the new lexicon of innovation is premised on
the empirically suspect assumption that the
public was leery of the “p word.” In fact the
terms innovation and productivity produce
roughly comparable levels of public interest. It
is important to recognize at the outset that the
public is a far different citizenry from what it
was just a decade ago when a previous govern-
ment tried, in vain, to rally public support
around another p word — prosperity.
The policy debate about Canada’s eco-
nomic performance and productivity has obvi-
ous implications for the public, not only
because the public will face any costs, in terms
of lower standard of living, of the failure to
address productivity but also because address-
ing the productivity gap will necessitate some
form of state action. Those who bemoan
Canada’s current levels of productivity do so
with an agenda for government in mind. In
simplistic terms, the state has two options: to
be active in terms of spending (either more or
differently) in ways that might improve pro-
ductivity, or to scale back the state. In the lat-
ter case, tax cuts are expected to stimulate
investment in new, innovative ways of pro-
ducing goods and services. In the former case,
government spending is expected to address
the underlying fundamentals of economic
activity through infrastructure development,
incentives for innovation and improvements
in human capital. The allocation of resources
across these different areas raises important
questions for government in terms of both its
expected return on investment — a largely
economic and social calculus — and the pub-
lic support for this allocation.
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impact of various alternative strategies on the
level of productivity. While we do not propose
to weigh in on these debates since our atten-
tion is focused on the attitudes of Canadians, it
is worth setting out some of the key elements
of the debate so as to place our survey ﬁndings
in context. Concern is most often raised that
Canada lags behind the United States in terms
of productivity growth (the take-up of new
technology/innovation and consequently the
output per worker). Clearly, productivity is
directly linked to the standard of living that
the public enjoys. According to Richard
Harris, “over long periods of time, productiv-
ity is the single most important determinant
of a nation’s living standard or its level of real
income” (1999, 3). Sharpe (2001) makes the
link between Canada’s lagging productivity
growth relative to the US performance and the
relative decline in Canadian standard of living
over the same period.
1 Though many under-
stand productivity in narrow economic terms,
it is clear in much of the debate that produc-
tivity is intrinsically linked to social as well as
economic progress. In fact, as we argue, one
cannot understand Canadian attitudes with-
out acknowledging the link between the com-
ponents of the debate and social well-being.
There are a number of reasons why it
will be crucial to understand the public per-
spective on economic growth and the role of
the state, not the least being that one of the
key failures of the earlier prosperity agenda
was that it did not ignite a sense of enthusi-
asm or ownership amongst the Canadian
public. Citizens are no longer deferential
bystanders to the economic policy process.
They are far more sophisticated, cynical and
interested in issues of economic policy. Both
general education and economic literacy are
rising dramatically in Canadian society, and
public attitudes to the economy, globaliza-
tion, technology and public ﬁnances are pro-
foundly different from what they were only
10 years ago. The public will want “in” on
the debate about their economic future,
which they increasingly see as intricately tied
to the ultimate question of their quality of
life. Finally, it is the behaviour of the public
as consumers, investors and taxpayers that
will determine whether we see productivity
gains. The policy process, therefore, ignores
public attitudes at its peril.
In 1999, EKOS undertook a public opin-
ion study of Canadians’ understanding of pro-
ductivity and public receptivity to a government
response. The survey, conducted between May
20 and June 10, 1999, involved a random sam-
ple of 2,500 respondents. In this paper we report
on some of the ﬁndings from this survey along
with more recent data drawn from Rethinking
Government
2and an Innovation survey (2001).
3
Together, these multiple data sources provide a
picture of how Canadians approach the debate.
The public response to the productivity chal-
lenge over the past four years reveals much about
how Canadians link social and economic out-
comes and how they understand the role of the
state in delivering public goods. For a majority,
any approach to improving productivity must be
aimed not just at economic efficiency and eco-
nomic beneﬁts but also at other social goods.
A variety of forces have produced a very
different public orientation to the economy
and public policy. These forces include broad
culture shifts in advanced Western societies
(Inglehart 1990; Nevitte 1996), burgeoning
levels of post-secondary education, unprece-
dented levels of public participation in the
economy (e.g., over half of the public own
equities either inside or outside an RRSP,
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high relative to earlier decades
4), focused
public attention on the relationship between
the economy and public ﬁnances during the
ﬁscal crisis, and mass media (including new
media) which provide more intense public
exposure to ﬁnance, markets and economic
policy issues. Not surprisingly, this set of
forces has produced a very different econom-
ic citizen — one more capable of and inter-
ested in playing a role, while at the same
time more pragmatic and less ideological.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the
shifting attitudes to technology and global-
ization, which were seen as threatening a
decade ago and are now seen as presenting
more opportunity than risk.
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS 
THE ECONOMY AND THE ROLE 
OF THE STATE
Perhaps the best starting point for con-
sidering public attitudes toward productivi-
ty is the state of the economy. Perceptions of
poor economic performance should be an
indicator of concern about the underlying
fundamentals of the economy and may in fact
result from a decline in relative productivity
in Canada. It would be hard to imagine con-
tinued Canadian satisfaction with economic
performance in the context of stagnation in
the “real” incomes of Canadians. In addition,
the economy is perhaps one area where pub-
lic perceptions are often particularly in tune
with the current economic environment,
even if there are occasional lags between how
the public sees the economy and its true state
(Graves 2001).
5 Since the late 1990s, percep-
tions of the economy have largely been improv-
ing. Despite considerable talk throughout
2001 about a signiﬁcant downturn, most
Canadians held on to a relatively optimistic
view of the economy. Many experienced a
decline in their short-term ﬁnancial situation
and outlook but viewed their situation as
better now than it was ﬁve years ago.
At fairly regular intervals over the past
three years, we have asked Canadians to indi-
cate whether they think their standard of liv-
ing  and quality of life have improved or
declined over the preceding 10 years (we have
asked half about quality of life and half about
standard of living). Chart 1 shows the results
of three readings for both indicators. Given
that one of the consequences of declining or
stagnant productivity is a decline or stagna-
tion in real incomes, it is worth noting that
across all three readings we ﬁnd that a plu-
rality, and a majority in some cases, believe
their standard of living and quality of life
have improved. The lack of movement in this
indicator is a further indication that if produc-
tivity is adversely affecting Canadians’ standard
of living, then the net effect is being offset by
other factors.
Canadians may think that their ﬁnan-
cial situation and their quality of life/stan-
dard of living have generally improved
relative to ﬁve years ago, but they are keenly
aware of their position in income terms rela-
tive to the United States. A plurality (48 per-
cent) — a majority when one sets aside the
“don’t knows” — say that Canadian workers
and households have lower incomes than
their US counterparts (Chart 2). Without
comparable data for another time period, we
cannot clearly establish whether this percep-
tion of lagging income is growing, but it is
an indication that the terms of the produc-
tivity debate are widely understood.
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believe that their quality of life is better than
that of Americans. This ﬁnding may reﬂect an
optimistic rationalization of the current situa-
tion, but it should be kept in mind that the
public perceives there are more opportunities
to achieve a high standard of living in the
United States. The distinction between
Canada’s advantage on quality of life and dis-
advantage on income is a central aspect of the
productivity debate. While Canadians are pos-
itive about their current standard of living and
quality of life, they place considerably greater
emphasis on quality of life as a goal as com-
pared with a high standard of living when
these are traded off. They may, therefore, be
willing to sacriﬁce some standard of living in
return for a better quality of life.
THE PRODUCTIVITY DEBATE 
One might have predicted that the pro-
ductivity debate would go over the heads of a
public more concerned about highly salient
issues like health care and more concrete issues
like the state of their pocketbook. Yet the pro-
ductivity debate, with its connections to sav-
ings, investment, technology and change,
provides a test of the degree to which the pub-
lic is capable of weighing complex public pol-
icy matters. How, then, would we expect
average Canadians to understand and concep-
tualize the debate about productivity? As
EKOS and others have argued, public assess-
ments of economic performance are fairly
closely tied to the macroeconomic indicators
of economic performance. This might, then,
provide the basis for a reasoned approach, for
many members of the public, to assessing the
debate.
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(a) Overall Quality of Life





Tracking Personal Quality of Life/Standard
of Living
“Thinking about your ..., do you think it has
gotten better or worse in the past 10 years?”
Source: Rethinking Government and Productivity Study,
June 1999.
Jan. 01 Dec. 99 June 99
(n=818) (n=1522) (n=2500)
Worse 18 23 23
No change 27 24 28
Better 55 53 49




worse no change better 
Jan. 01 Dec. 99 June 99
(n=818) (n=1522) (n=2500)
Worse 20 28 23
No change 28 25 28
Better 51 47 49
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Canadians may come to terms with the pro-
ductivity challenge:
> Productivity may be understood as an
element of the macroeconomy. Those
who understand economic realities may
be more engaged in the debate, leaving
those who lack such an understanding
unable to fully participate. We would
also expect that those who are worried
or concerned about either current or
future economic performance would
identify productivity as a critical issue.
> Productivity may be understood in ide-
ological terms. In particular, those who
see an active role for the state may be
more likely to want government to act
but are also more suspicious of the moti-
vations underlying the debate and
unwilling to see the solution in terms of
less government.
It is possible, then, to consider these
two different perspectives — productivity as
an element of a strong economy and produc-
tivity as a political project with winners and
losers — as lenses through which to examine
the public’s understanding of the meaning
and nature of productivity in Canada and the
arguments surrounding it. As we shall see,
there are elements of both these perspectives
in the views of Canadians.
The evidence from the 1999 EKOS sur-
vey indicates that many features of the produc-
tivity debate resonate with the public — with
most Canadians able to offer a top-of-the-mind
image of what it means for them (Chart 3),
while about 26 percent were unable or unwill-
ing to respond. In addition, the general public
deﬁnes productivity in terms that resemble
those used by economists. The most frequent
response terms were grouped under the label
“production, effort and efficiency,” followed by
general references to work and employment.
6
These and other data indicate that, for most
people, productivity does not engender fear but
rather a connection to, or a sense of, hard work,
effort, results and security.
7
Improving economic productivity is also
a priority for the public. It is a lower priority
than health, education, environment and crime,
but a higher priority than taxation, immigra-
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48 19 21 12
48 19 21 12
Personal income (Can. worker)
Household income (Can. family of four)
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Individual can achieve high standard of living
CHART 2
International Comparison
(a) “How do you think the average personal
income for a Canadian worker compares to that in
the United States?”
Note: Each question asked of 1/2 sample. n=1250.
Source: Productivity Study, June 19. 
(b) “How do you think Canada compares with the
US in each of the following areas...?”
Source: Innovation Study, June 2001.
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whelming majority (82 percent) believe that
improving productivity is essential to improving
our standard of living (Table 1). Substantial
majorities, 70 and 67 percent respectively, also
claim to be worried that if we don’t improve our
productivity there will be a decline in both our
quality of life and standard of living. This is an
initial indication that for the public productiv-
ity is linked not only to economic concerns
(standard of living) but also to broader, quality-
of-life issues. Concern with productivity is, how-
ever, fairly universally shared among Canadians.
For example, 67 percent of university-educated
people are concerned about the impact on stan-
dard of living, compared with 66 percent of those
with high school or less education. Concern is also
unrelated to individuals’ perceptions of future
economic performance.
However, the public is not without some
scepticism about the motivation underlying
some of the debate about productivity and some
of the potential costs. A slim majority (53 per-
cent) agree with the statement that large busi-
ness and wealthy Canadians have manufactured
recent concern about productivity.
8 Chart 4
shows that scepticism is highest among lower-
income, less-educated Canadians, and is also high
among people who do not recall hearing about
productivity
9and people who rate Canada’s level
of productivity as good. As we will show, most
Canadians do think that productivity is good in
Canada but this is an indication that thinking
things are good produces a resistance to the
arguments about the need for a productivity
agenda.
In an earlier survey we also found the
public divided about whether talk of produc-
tivity was code for job losses and longer hours
for the same pay. While increasing productivi-
ty would affect jobs — especially for those in
less productive sectors — as fewer people pro-
duce a larger amount of product, both of these
indicators suggest that talk of productivity,
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CHART 3
Top-of-Mind Images
“What is the ﬁrst thing that comes to mind when
you hear the term ‘productivity’?”
Note: n=2500




Increasing Canada’s economic 
productivity is essential to 
improving our standard of living.1 82 11 6
I really worry that if we don’t 
improve the productivity of the 
economy, the QUALITY OF LIFE 
will suffer.2 70 16 13
I really worry that if we don’t 
improve the productivity of the 
economy, the STANDARD OF 
LIVING will suffer.2 67 19 14
Much of the recent concern about 
our level of productivity has been 
manufactured by large business 
and wealthy Canadians.1 53 10 23
Talk of economic productivity is just 
code for job losses and longer 
hours for the same pay.2 36 27 33
1 Rethinking Government, Nov-Dec. 1998.
2 Productivity Study, June 1999.
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tially an ideological signal for some Canadians.
Nevertheless, when forced to make a
choice between productivity as a job destroyer
and productivity as a job creator, three in four
respondents choose the latter (Chart 5). So,
although a minority sees improving productiv-
ity as a job destroyer, a focus on productivity is
one of the few areas that most people do not see
as a zero-sum game but as a source of improve-
ment in the overall number of jobs. Similarly,
when probed further about what kinds of jobs
they expected to be produced, three in four
thought high-skill jobs were more likely to
emerge. Thus, productivity is seen as an impor-
tant goal, but the pursuit of a productivity
agenda is not seen in purely optimistic terms.
Although the public leans toward the positive,
it has a healthy dose of scepticism about the
motivations behind and the consequences of an
emphasis on productivity. 
How, then, does the public see Canada
measuring up in terms of the level of produc-
tivity? Does the scepticism indicate a naïve
belief that Canada has a high level of produc-
tivity? Or, alternatively, does the high priori-
ty accorded to productivity indicate a belief
that Canada is in a troublesome position? As
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CHART 4
Skepticism by Key Demographic and
Attitudinal Groups
“Much of the recent concern about our level of
productivity has been manufactured by large
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Improving productivity will  
improve efficiency in the  
economy and  LEAD TO  
JOB LOSSES as fewer  
people are needed to do  
the work required
Improving productivity will  
stimulate the economy and 





Net Impact on Jobs
“Which of the following two statements is closest
to your point of view?”
Note: n=2500
Source: Productivity Study, June 1999.
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the positive in assessing Canadian productivi-
ty in the abstract but tends to be more nega-
tive when comparing our level of productivity
to that in the United States. Few people (18
percent) rate Canadian productivity as poor,
and a plurality (44 percent) rate it as good
overall. The distribution leans in the positive
direction, but few give Canada high marks.
On the seven-point scale, 32 percent give a
ﬁve, the weakest positive assessment, and only
3 percent give a seven, the strongest positive
assessment. No wonder there is concern about
the quality-of-life and standard-of-living ram-
iﬁcations of failing to address productivity.
Ratings of Canada’s level of productivity
are generally unrelated to general socio-demo-
graphic indicators (Chart 7). Men are margin-
ally more positive, but there are no substantive
differences across education and income. The
only age group to differ signiﬁcantly is youth,
those under 25 who tend on average to express
greater levels of optimism on many indicators
despite their tendency to be less engaged in
250







(a) “How would you rate Canada’s current level of
productivity?”
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
dk worse the same better
15 UK 26 32 26
50 US 25 20 5
54 Japan 18 14 14
(b) “And how do you think Canada’s level of
productivity compares to that of ...?”
Note: Each option asked of 1/3 sample. n=2500
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CHART 7
Rating Productivity by Key Groups
“How would you rate Canada’s current level of
productivity?”
% who rate productivity “good”
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that productivity is understood to be an ele-
ment of the macroeconomy in the same way,
perhaps, as unemployment or inﬂation.
Those who are cynical about the moti-
vations underlying a productivity agenda, as
indicated by their agreement with the state-
ment that the recent concern has been manu-
factured, are considerably more likely to rate
Canada’s productivity as good. However, when
we consider attitudes about the likely impact
of improving productivity on jobs, those who
think there will be job improvements and
those who think there will be job losses rate
productivity the same. There is, therefore, only
modest evidence that attitudes toward pro-
ductivity are symbolic of ideological position-
ing. The most important drivers are expected
economic performance and perceived changes
in quality of life and standard of living in
Canada. Chart 7 shows that those who are pes-
simistic about their ﬁnancial situation (expect
it to get worse) are more likely to rate Canada’s
level of productivity as poor. Though only a
minority in 1999 thought things were getting
worse, those who said things were getting
worse for either quality of life or standard of
living were twice as likely to rate Canada’s pro-
ductivity as poor (Table 2).
While the overall evaluation may be pos-
itive, Canadians are aware of Canada’s compar-
ative disadvantage on this measure vis-à-vis the
United States (Chart 6b). Each respondent was
asked to compare Canada to one of three possible
countries (the United States, Japan and the
United Kingdom).
10 The only country they per-
ceive Canada as having a productivity advantage
over is the United Kingdom (though one in four
are unable to say how Canada would fare in such
a comparison). Roughly one in two believe that
Canada’s level of productivity is worse than that
of the United States
11 and Japan, while few
believe that it is higher (20 and 14 percent
respectively). Recall that the public also
believes that Canada has an income gap with
the United States. Though not shown, those
who believe Canada’s quality of life or standard
of living have deteriorated are more likely to
say that Canada has a productivity deﬁcit with
the United States.
When we asked senior Canadian deci-
sion-makers and elites
12 to compare Canada’s
productivity to that of the United States in the
2000 iteration of Rethinking Government, a
majority gave Canada a lower rating (Chart 8).
Assessments of the future are somewhat more
optimistic, but negative expectations continue
to outweigh positive ones by a margin of almost
two to one. The public appears to be more posi-
tive than elites but not so much more as to be
out of touch with the debate or to be unlikely to
support a policy response. In fact, the Canadian
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TABLE 2
Impact of Quality-of-Life/Standard-of-Living Assessment on Rating Productivity
Quality of Life Standard of Living 
Rating of 
Canada’s 
productivity Worse Same Better Worse Same Better
Poor 31 21 12 29 17 14
Neither 41 42 33 40 42 32
Good 28 38 54 31 41 54
Source: Productivity Study, June 1999.
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evidenced by its concern about the potential
cost, to quality of life and standard of living, of
failing to improve productivity.
In general the public has an appetite for
improving productivity, the consequence of
both a general view that Canada is under-per-
forming relative to the United States and a luke-
warm overall rating of Canadian productivity.
Perceptions of Canada’s level of productivity are
also ﬁrmly rooted in current assessments of our
standard of living and quality of life and expec-
tations of future economic prosperity. This is not
to say that there are not points of dispute. Elites
in particular are more likely to rate Canada
poorly, and some reject the need for a produc-
tivity agenda.
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
It is clear that the public has a reasonable
understanding of the essential components of
the productivity debate and appreciates the ben-
eﬁts of a productivity agenda. But does the pub-
lic see the need for a state-driven productivity
agenda? The answer is clearly yes, but the pre-
ferred toolkit is mixed and at odds with some of
the main prescriptions (e.g., tax cuts, R&D
investment) offered by key voices in the debate.
Few Canadians see the federal govern-
ment as taking a leadership role in improving
productivity (Chart 9). A majority would pre-
fer that the government act as an equal partner
with the provinces, the private sector and the
public. A similar role is envisioned for govern-
ment when it comes to improving quality of
life, which suggests that there is nothing
unique, when it comes to productivity, in the
leadership role attributed to the federal gov-
ernment.
13 It also suggests that the public
would prefer that government be strategic
about things so as to ensure that the public
gets the collective goods it wants.
The public toolkit for addressing pro-
ductivity through state action is heavily
252
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CHART 8
Elite Views of Canadian/US Economy
“How would you rate Canada’s economic
productivity compared to that of the
United States? Do you think Canada’s
economic productivity is comparatively ...?”
“Thinking ten years in the future, do you
think Canada’s economic productivity will
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priorities. Chart 10 shows the results of a trade-
off analysis in which the reported score is the
percentage of time that each option is selected
over another randomly drawn option.
14 Health
care is seen as the best allocation of money
aimed at improving productivity, followed by
a fund to help workers improve their skills and
incentives to steer students toward science and
technology. An early childhood development
initiative also scores high. All of these options
address productivity by improving human cap-
ital. These types of government investment are
part of an agenda aimed at improving the stan-
dard of living of Canadians (Sulzenko and
Kalwarowsky 2000).
Corporate tax cuts as an option fares
the worst, with personal income tax cuts and
debt reduction faring better in the tradeoffs.
The public appears to reject the idea that
cutting corporate tax would lead to increased
investments in new, innovative and more
productive approaches. Both tax-reduction
options are more strongly supported by those
at the top of the income scale and by those
who rate Canada’s current level of produc-
tivity as low. An infrastructure, “roads and
potholes” approach is also rejected compared
with the other options.
A range of more speciﬁc policy approach-
es to productivity has a reasonable level of sup-
port. These include supporting innovation in
natural resources, incentives for business R&D
and updating of machinery, and tax relief to
attract high-tech investment. In forced tradeoffs
with other options, these options are chosen one
time out of two.
In a separate study, Rethinking
Government, conducted at roughly the same
time, we posed a number of questions to both
members of the general public and a sample of
senior decision-makers and elites in Canada
253
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CHART 9
Preferred Federal Role
“Overall, thinking about a national goal of improving ..., which of the following is the most appropriate











0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Quality of Life
LEADERSHIP ROLE, directing efforts of
provinces, private sector and citizens
EQUAL PARTNER with other provinces,
private sector and citizens
JUNIOR PARTNER, supporting provinces,
private sector and citizens
NO ROLE (volunteered)
Note: n=2500. Each question asked of 1/2 sample.
Source: Productivity Study, June 1999.
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alternative ways that the government could
improve the level of Canada’s overall eco-
nomic productivity: a national learning strat-
egy, a corporate and personal tax-cut strategy,
and a technology strategy. The alternatives
are not exhaustive, but they cover the three
basic elements of what productivity is often
understood to be about: highly skilled work-
ers, a positive investment climate, and a focus
on innovation and technology.
Although people generally reject single-
focus approaches in favour of mixed strategies,
forcing them to choose one of the three does pro-
duce signiﬁcant ﬁndings. Among the general
public, all three approaches receive some sup-
port, with the least preferred approach — a
technology strategy — favoured by 23 percent.
The most favoured option is the national learn-
ing strategy to help Canadian workers (human
investment strategy). These results are consis-
tent with the tradeoff analysis. Among the deci-
sion-makers and elites, the pattern is strikingly
different. A majority of decision-makers  (57
percent) choose a strategy of cutting corporate and
income taxes as the preferred option followed by
a national learning strategy. Surprisingly, elites
tend to reject a technology strategy, perhaps
254
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CHART 10
Productivity Tradeoffs
“If you were Prime Minister for one day and you
had to choose how to allocate $1 billion to
improve Canada’s productivity, which of the
following two would you choose in the best public
interest?”
Note: Presented in series of random paired choices
Percent indicates average number of times option is
selected over all others. n=2500
Source: Productivity Study, June 1999.
0 2 04 06 08 0 100
Create national fund to help 
 workers improve skills
Improve health care
Incentives to steer Cdn. students 
 toward S&T
Support early childhood 
 development initiatives
Across-the-board 
 personal income tax cuts
Pay down the national debt
Repayable investments to 
 businesses for R&D
Support innovation in 
 natural resources industries
Encourage Cdn. businesses to update 
 machinery and equipment
Tax relief to attract high-tech 
 investment to Canada
Give Canadians access/skills 
 to use info. highway
















Best Way to Improve Productivity
“On the issue of productivity, which one of the
following three choices would be the best way for



















(a) General public (n=1479)
B
C




A - A national learning strategy to help Canadian workers.
B - A corporate and personal tax-cut strategy to reduce
costs and stimulate the economy.
C - A national technology and “connectiveness” strategy
to help business and citizens access the latest high-tech
processes and equipment.
Source: Productivity Study, June 1999.
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of government. However, there are important
differences among the elite groups. The tax-cut
strategy is the almost unanimous preference (86
percent) of private-sector elites, while public-
sector and NGO elites are closer to the general
public, although they are even less interested in
a technology strategy.
Another way to demonstrate the impor-
tance of human investment as a role of gov-
ernment is to look at how Canadians would
measure a successful innovation agenda (Chart
12). Again using the tradeoff approach, drawn
this time from the Innovation study in 2001,
the two options most frequently chosen were
both related to human beneﬁts: more skilled
workers staying in Canada and a higher quali-
ty of life. The next set of options chosen was
related to economic performance: a stronger
economy, more people working and a higher
standard of living.
Further evidence comes from public rejec-
tion of the idea that the current level of social
spending is an impediment to improving
Canada’s current level of productivity (Chart
13). When asked to choose between the view
that “social programs detract from Canada’s pro-
ductivity because they cost so much and keep
taxes higher” and the view that “social programs
are important forms of investment which
increase Canada’s productivity by ensuring a
healthy, secure population,” Canadians agree
with the pro-productivity proposition by a mar-
gin of 75 to 25 percent.
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A higher quality of life
Stronger Canadian economy
More people working
A higher standard of living
A more flexible, skilled population
More new ideas patented
More company start-ups based on
 university/gov’t research
Being a global leader
in a few key industries
Less private sector demand
 for gov’t investment
More skilled workers




















Measuring a Successful Innovation Agenda
“What would be the best test of the success of a
focus on innovation?”
Note: Randomly selected paired tradeoffs. 
Percentages represent aggregate wins.
Source: Innovation Study, June 2001.
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“Which of the following two statements is closest
to your point of view? (a) Social programs DETRACT
FROM CANADA’S PRODUCTIVITY because they cost
so much and keep taxes higher (b) Social programs
are important human investments which INCREASE
CANADA’S PRODUCTIVITY by ensuring a healthy,
secure population”
Note: Base: All Canadians
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programs merely wishful thinking? Chart 13
also breaks down the results by the respon-
dent’s level of education and perception of cur-
rent Canadian productivity. Not surprisingly,
those who rate Canada’s productivity as poor
are more likely to say that social programs
detract.
15 Indeed, those who think that
Canada is faring poorly are more likely to see our
social programs as the culprit, though even here
65 percent support the view of social programs
as providing important beneﬁts. Signiﬁcantly,
those with higher levels of education, and pre-
sumably more knowledge and considered views
about the debate, are actually less likely to
say that social programs detract. The idea of
social spending as an investment does res-
onate with Canadians.
There is clearly a signiﬁcant gap in the
understanding of how productivity should be
dealt with between the residents of Canada’s
family rooms and the residents of its board-
rooms: the fairly balanced approach of the gen-
eral public with its accent ﬁrst on lifelong
learning skills and knowledge compared with
the strong preference toward a tax-cut strate-
gy among the elites. There are competing
explanations for these different opinions on
policy. On the one hand, despite understand-
ing many of the fundamentals of the produc-
tivity debate, the policy options favoured by
the public may simply reﬂect the kinds of
activities that they prefer to have government
undertaking irrespective of their impact on
productivity. Certainly the policy options that
come out on top are ﬁrmly rooted in the prior-
ities and values that the public expresses in
general about the role of government. On the
other hand, those who rate Canada’s produc-
tivity as poor are more likely to support the
tax-cut strategy and less likely to emphasize
human investment. This suggests that a more
negative attitude concerning the current level
of productivity might produce a different pol-
icy toolkit. It is just that a seriously negative
outlook has not emerged.
CONCLUSIONS
Many features of the debate on the need
to improve productivity had ﬁltered down to
the public as early as 1999, even though at that
time a majority could not recall hearing much
about it and those who could were divided
about whether they were hearing positive or
negative things. That said, most people believe
that Canada is in a relatively weaker position
than our major trading partner in terms of
both productivity and income. The perceived
gap is partially related to the view that improv-
ing productivity is central to the long-term
economic well-being (standard of living) and
social well-being (quality of life) of Canadians.
Importantly, those who think that Canada’s
situation has worsened in terms of either qual-
ity of life or standard of living are more pes-
simistic about Canadian productivity.
Ultimately, the degree to which Canadians
are able to consider the key elements of the debate
is symptomatic of a public that is more in tune
with contemporary economic developments and
more capable of taking part than might be
expected. Certainly the argument can be made
that discussions about productivity, innova-
tion and other aspects of economic perform-
ance should not be left solely to the purview
of the private sector, economists, politicians
and other experts. The Canadian public today,
like that in most other advanced Western
countries, is much less deferential than in the
past — much less willing to see such decisions
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doors. Many members of the public recognize
the key components of the debate and have a
position on the kinds of responses government
should undertake.
In part, public attitudes derive from the
fact that the public understands the issues and
looks to the state to provide public goods, and
a strong vibrant, productive economy is clear-
ly one such good. The desire to establish a link
between economic and social progress is clear
in the public mind and could be identiﬁed
under the rubric of humanomics (Graves 2000).
People want to understand productivity as
something associated with having a healthy
economy, which requires human investment,
and which is ultimately sought for the pur-
pose of having a higher quality of life.
Productivity for a higher standard of living
might be characterized as a Bay Street model
focused primarily on tax cuts and minimal
government. This model does have a con-
stituency — about one in four Canadians —
who, not surprisingly, tend to be male, afflu-
ent and economically secure. The Bay Street
model, however, does not resonate with most
Canadians who want more of a Main Street
productivity agenda. An agenda focused pri-
marily on achieving a higher quality of life.
The choice of policy instruments and
approaches is related to perceptions about the
state of the productivity problem, with those
whose assessment is most negative being
most supportive of the Bay Street model.
In moving forward, the public believes
there are some clear winners and losers among
the various strategies. Some elements are seen
as more important than others. For example,
the clear winners were human capital and inno-
vation. The clear losers, relatively speaking,
were corporate tax cuts, minimal government
and the old passive redistribution tools for
dealing with inequality. Governments and oth-
ers interested in advancing a productivity
agenda would do best to frame it as a means
for achieving a higher quality of life. There is
a growing desire to explicitly link and coordi-
nate social and economic policy, and not to see
them as tradeoffs. Canadians are evidently not
in the dark about the current state of the econ-
omy, so it is not simply a matter of overcom-
ing an information deﬁciency. In fact, the
Canadian public preference for a human invest-
ment approach to productivity is consistent
with Heath’s argument, in this volume, that
an emphasis on productivity should not come
at the expense of other priorities, many of
which are not inconsistent with productivity
growth.
NOTES
The authors would like to thank Keith Banting,
Andrew Sharpe and the anonymous reviewer for their
helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
All errors remain, of course, those of the authors.
1 There is some debate about these conclusions. Treﬂer
(1999) cautions that productivity levels vary
considerably by type of output, with low-end
manufacturing performing well.
2 Rethinking Government is a syndicated research
program that began in 1994 and is continued on an
annual basis. Each year approximately 6,000
Canadians are interviewed as part of a three-wave
survey program that tracks Canadian attitudes on a
range of government issues.
3 The Innovation survey was conducted between June
13 and 22, 2001 with a nationally representative
random sample of 1,955 Canadians.
4 Between 1976 and 1989, aggregate labour market
participation rose rapidly to an all-time high in 1989
fuelled largely by the entry of women into the labour
force (Ip 1998).
5 By lags we mean that the public may be slow to fully
appreciate an improvement in the economy or slow
to recognize the depth of a downturn. The lags are,
of course, evident at the macro level and should not
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assessments of the economy.
6 All responses were transcribed by the interviewers and
then grouped by common theme by trained coders.
7 We also presented respondents with a set of paired
terms (damaging vs. rewarding for Canada;
pessimistic vs. optimistic; insecure vs. secure) and
asked them to select the one that best described their
attitude to productivity. Majorities for all pairs chose
the positive response.
8 Of course, this is a reﬂection of the broader resonance
for the public of the idea that big business has too
much inﬂuence on government policy.
9 The wording of the question was, “Do you recall
reading, hearing or seeing anything recently about
the state of Canada’s productivity?” Whereas 67
percent said no, 19 percent said, “yes, vaguely” and
13 percent said, “yes, clearly.”
10 Perceptions of a productivity gap are highly related to
educational attainment, with more education associated
with a greater likelihood of seeing Canada as behind.
11 Beliefs about Canada’s productivity are highly
related to assessments of its position relative to the
United States. Those who are positive about Canada’s
productivity are considerably less negative about the
comparison with the United States. A respondent
who thinks Canada is doing poorly is twice as likely
to think that the United States has a higher level,
which suggests that the comparison with the United
States is factored into the overall assessment of our
own level.
12 These elites are drawn from among the CEOs of the
largest companies, the deputy minister cadre in senior
governments, elected officials and the largest NGOs.
13 This is a critical element of the public’s current
understanding of the role of government in the
process of achieving collective goods. The public
wants the government to extend its role across many
policy areas and adopt a long-term vision, but it also
sees government in a less paternalistic light.
14 Each respondent was given four sets of pairs,
randomly assigned, so the results here aggregate
across all respondents and all pair selections.
15  Though not shown, one would ﬁnd similar results if
one looked at ratings of Canada in comparison with
the United States.
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